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ABSTRACT
Since the development of containers and Intermodalism in the late 1960’s, containerization is 
constantly growing and penetrating almost all seaborne trade sectors, as by 2016 nearly1.7 billion 
tons were transported by container [8]. Moreover, Container ports play an important role as nodes 
in the supply chain and focal points for containerized cargo as they complement and add value to the 
shipping lines and shippers’ objectives. Moreover, competition among container ports is taking place 
at all levels regionally, nationally and internally. In the same context, shipping lines are competing 
vigorously and increasing their fleets in both size and number of vessels, resulting in excess market 
supply. Recently, shipping lines are consolidating rapidly by means of vertical and horizontal 
integration through mergers, acquisitions and forming alliances to cool down competition and 
backup each other as well as escape bankruptcy. This policy increased the market concentration and 
shipping lines bargaining power and exposed container ports to more competitive environment as 
well. The key point put forward in this paper is that the competitive battle among container ports will 
increasingly be fought with the presence of recent shipping lines market concentration. This paper 
illustrates the contemporary dynamics in the container shipping market. In that respect, the paper is 
divided into three main sections. The first one presents the port competition conceptual definition, 
types and landscapes. The second one outlines the analyses of the existing carriers’ contemporary 
market dynamics. Finally, discusses the possible outcomes of different development policies of 
shipping companies, and how they affect ports’ effectiveness and competitiveness. 
1 Introduction
In recent decades, globalization, market integration, 
and global reorganization of investment and labour forces 
reshaped the world production and consumption map. 
Moreover, containerization and inter-modality fueled the 
development of the international transport network, as in 
2016, the seaborne containerized cargo reached around 
1.7 billion tons transported by container ships and con-
tainer ports handled around 0.7 billion TEUs [8]. This in-
creased the role of ports in the global supply chain and 
extensively impacted port competition.
Port rivalry has become so vigorous and multi-faceted 
concept due to continuous changes in the ports and ship-
ping market condition, causing an increase in competition 
among operators in the same port, among adjacent ports, 
multi-port gateway regions as well as among whole port 
ranges [21]. Privatization of ports and injections of private 
investments also powered competition between ports, 
as from 2000 to 2016, the private sector invested in 292 
projects with approximately 68.6 billion USD in 63 coun-
tries with emerging and developing economies [29].
Moreover, the growing trend of mergers, acquisition, 
alliances of shipping companies as well as deployment of 
huge carriers magnifies shipping market concentration, 
resulting in an increased bargaining power against ports. 
In addition, it reduces the number of weekly liner servic-
es: for example the North Europe-Far East weekly services 
declined from 35 in 2006 to 26 in 2012, then to 21 in 2015 
and only 17 in 2017. This concept of larger ships with few-
er services fueled the competition among container ports, 
knowing that one weekly service of such giant vessels con-
tributes to around 450,000 TEUs in ports throughput an-
nually [22].
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This paper aims to investigate the current trends in 
port competition by analysing the dynamics of the car-
riers’ market. This will be carried out by presenting the 
concepts, definitions and thorough analyses of the market 
conditions. In that respect, the paper is divided into three 
main sections. The first one presents the port competition 
conceptual definition, types and landscapes and their con-
sequences in everyday life. The second one outlines the 
analyses of the existing carriers’ market dynamics. Finally, 
the third one discusses the possible outcomes of different 
development policies, especially those adopted and imple-
mented by shipping companies, and how they affect ports’ 
effectiveness and competitiveness. 
2 Ports competition 
Ports with their importance and nature as major nodes 
in the supply chain are experiencing a dynamic competi-
tive environment. Understanding the conceptual mean-
ing of competition, types of competition as well as ports 
competition landscape are very important if one wants to 
evaluate the influence of the carrier’s market behaviour on 
ports competitiveness.
2.1 Conceptual definition
Port competition concept was not a well-defined con-
cept for its complex nature. Henceforth, the characteristics 
and nature of competition depend mostly on the type of 
the port involved; for example, the environment is very 
different if the port is a gateway port, local port or tran-
shipment port, as well as on the type of cargo handled 
(for example, consumer products, wet bulk or dry bulk). 
Consequently, most researchers attempt to define compe-
tition as either a process or a state of affairs. When com-
petition is demonstrated as a process, some researches 
express entrepreneurs as the key to success [12]. 
Knight (1921) was one of the first who focused on the 
notion of risk. He asserted that risk taking is the function 
of the entrepreneur success for their efforts. The common 
theme of this debate was that a competitive market system 
is one where entrepreneurs compete without obstruction 
with each other for success. The struggle characterizes 
market contestability in which the strong competition is 
the theme of the market. Another definition of port com-
petitiveness is the ability of the port to create added value, 
create core business and develop productive activity with-
in its market. As such, the most competitive port will be 
able to establish a differentiated policy and gaining more 
customers than its competitors [4].
2.2 Port competition types 
The factors influencing port competition may vary ac-
cording to its level. The competi tive strength of single 
undertakings inside a port is determined mostly by the 
aspects of production (labour, capital, technology, and en-
ergy). Rivalry among ports, port clusters and port ranges 
is mainly affected by regional factors, for instance the lo-
cation, the existing infrastructure, the industrial devel-
opment, government policy and the port performance 
(measured as proxy variables, such as the number and 
frequency of liner services, and transhipment cost, storage 
and hinterland transporta tion) which bear considerable 
importance for this research [17].
Port competition can be categorized into three main 
categories that show the complete concept of seaport 
competition and explain the relationship between ports 
and port activities [30]. Figure 1 presents the types of port 
competition categories that most ports are likely to face, 
all or some of them, in their business: inter-port competi-
tion, intra-port competition, and inter-port competition at 
the port authority level. 
Inter-port competition can be defined as the competi-
tion between different ports. The main factor showing if 
ports are experiencing inter-port completion is the share 
of common hinterland or foreland [5]. Inter-port com-
petition can be classified into three subcategories. The 
first is competition between the whole port range and 
coastlines; an example is the competition among con-
tainer ports on the East and West Coast of North America 
Figure 1 Types of Port Competition
Source: Author, adapted from [17] 
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as well as in Europe (among ports in the Hamburg-Le 
Havre range). The competition increases mostly due to 
the expansion of both the multimodal and long-distance 
transport systems. The second type is the competition 
between ports in different countries; the example is com-
petition between Vancouver in Canada against Tacoma 
and Seattle in the United States. In Europe, this can be 
recognized between Rotterdam in the Netherlands and 
Antwerp in Belgium. The third type is competition at 
the national level where competition takes place among 
different ports within the same country as ports are 
serving the same overlapped hinterlands; the notable 
examples are the competition between Los Angeles and 
Long Beach in California or between Qingdao and Dalian 
in Northern China [30]. 
Inter-port competition may exert high risk of losing 
traffic [5]. Therefore, ports should keep their competitive 
edge especially in respect of ever larger container ves-
sels as well as in respect of a high consolidation of ship-
ping lines and their bargaining power. Ports should have 
the same development pace as shipping lines and invest 
in infra/superstructure to accommodate their mammoth 
container vessels. Moreover, they are expected to continu-
ously improve efficiency of cargo handling and to shorter 
ships’ turnaround time in port, to avoid losing customers, 
having in mind shipping liner companies that are more 
flexible than ports. 
A vertical integration of shipping liner companies also 
influences intra-port competition. For instance, the agree-
ment between CMA CGM and PSA in Singapore aiming to 
establish a new joint venture company to operate 4 berths 
in the port of Singapore (to handle nearly 3 million TEUs 
annually) will definitely affect Port Klang because approxi-
mately 20% of the Port Klang’s throughput is carried by 
CMA CGM [10].
The second type of port competition is intra-port 
competition which is mainly linked to terminal opera-
tors, ownerships and port administration. This type of 
competition can assume two forms. The first is a direct 
competition between terminals operating in the same 
port; a notable example is in the port of Antwerp where 
three container terminals operators Hessenatie, Noord 
Natie and Katoenatie compete for the same market share. 
Similarly, in the port of Rotterdam, the rivalry between 
APM and ECT can be clearly recognized. The second form 
of the intra-port competition can be identified when oper-
ators using the same terminal compete among each other. 
The level of competition directly determines the flexibil-
ity of terminal operators - the lower the level of intra port 
competition, the higher the flexibility of the port, in par-
ticular in respect of the pricing policy [28]. A special case 
occurs when the port authority acts as a competitor, i.e. 
when a port authority has shares in port undertakings or 
terminal operators. 
In this context, national port policies should always 
aim to enhance the performance and the efficiency of the 
whole port activities within the country. Since intra-port 
competition occurs within a port, it is, therefore, not di-
rectly affected by specific aspects of national policies and 
regulations. Taking these into account, port authorities are 
expected to ensure contestable conditions for all players 
within the internal port market. Meanwhile, [30] argued 
that a port authority should play an active role in encour-
aging cooperative activities that optimize port economies 
of scale and scope.
The third type of port competition is inter-port com-
petition at port authority level i.e. taking into account the 
utility mission of seaports. This type of competition ex-
ists between port authorities at a national, local, regional 
or international level. It can be clearly identified when the 
rival ports share the same market and handle the same 
cargo type(s). A clear example of that kind of competition 
is the competition between ports within the Hamburg-Le 
Havre range, container ports in the Mediterranean, Hong 
Kong and Singapore in the Far East and between New York 
and Halifax on the East Coast of North America [32]. These 
ports, to a large extent, compete for containers and are 
investing to keep pace with the future demand and to in-
crease their throughput and market share.
2.3 The Landscape of Port Competition
In the early days of containerization, the inter-port 
competition was not so significant, as most of the ports 
were known for being either monopolistic or oligopolistic 
for its traffic which was limited and concentrated upon the 
port’s geographical area. Nevertheless, the development of 
containerization and multimodal transportation has con-
siderably reformed the business environment and forced 
ports to improve their attractiveness in terms of hinter-
land accessibility, productivity, and quality of services, 
reputation and reliability. Recently, competition and com-
petitiveness are crucial for any port or terminal operator 
as this will radiate in all operation, planning and develop-
ment strategies. 
Moreover, the landscape where ports competition 
takes place is very important for decision makers. The 
main forces that shape the completion in any port (Figure 
2) are:
1) the rivalry among existing competitors
2) the threat of new competitors
3) the potential for global substitutes
4) the bargaining power of port users
5) the bargaining power of port service.
These forces will affect nearly all ports in all sizes and 
will influence the port investment plans, efficiency, pric-
ing policies. Finally, ports’ profitability will mainly depend 
on how managements deal with these forces and how 
decision-makers tackle these challenges. Shipping market 
dynamics and how it affects the carriers bargaining power 
and exert pressure on ports competition is very important 
to be investigated before port managers take any strategic 
decision.
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3 Liner shipping marketing dynamics
The ongoing dynamics in the highly competitive con-
tainer markets made competition among container ports 
highly connected to shipping lines dynamics and transfor-
mations. Alliances and shipping lines merging are having 
a great influence on inter-port competition as they may 
significantly affect the balance of bargaining power be-
tween ports and carriers [22]. Container shipping lines in 
the first ten years of containerization were not facing any 
problem with profitability as they were secured by the 
revenue pooling agreements based on conference tariffs 
[23]. But over the last decade, container carriers have sig-
nificantly financially drifted in comparison to other indus-
tries and that forced them to focus on optimization of all 
processes through horizontal and vertical integration.
Horizontal integration has been performed mainly 
through three distinctive forms: 
1) trade agreements (like liner conferences), 
2) operating agreements (that is, vessel sharing agree-
ments, slot chartering agreements, consortia and 
strategic alliances) and 
3) mergers and acquisitions.
The process resulted in a significant consolidation, 
causing 70% of the market to be controlled by the seven 
largest operators in 2016 [14]. 
At the same time the vertical integration has been 
achieved by many shipping lines since the late 60s (for 
example, Mitsui OSK Line (MOL), Evergreen, K-Line and 
Maersk), resulting in their significant involvement in ter-
minal operations and logistic activities [24]. This has been 
done to benefit from economy of scale, customer reten-
tion as well as stabilization of revenue [26]. Vertical inte-
gration caused the increased competition not only among 
ports but also between the whole supply chains.
Figure 2 Ports Competition Landscape
Source: Author, adopted from [31] 
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Recently, the competition among liner shipping compa-
nies and the desire to increase the market supply resulted 
in gigantic vessels, which lead to a negative balance sheet 
to many of them. Consequently, they rushed toward merg-
ers, acquisitions and alliances to save their existence as 
well as to strengthen their businesses in port operations 
as a toll of reducing cost and gain control. 
3.1 Liner shipping companies financial condition
The containerization industry was increasing dramati-
cally (by about 8% from 1990 to 2010). Liner shipping 
companies were competing mainly by ordering gigantic 
container ships, thus causing the world fleet to grow by al-
most 15%. It is in line with the expectations that the global 
container trade will grow in double digits. Unfortunately, 
the world economy grew more slowly. Consequently, the 
global container demand grew less than 1 per cent in 2015 
and a huge over capacity of container shipping tonnage 
was deployed in the market. In the same context, since 
2007, the industry has been witnessing a very poor finan-
cial outcome as a result of the severe competition between 
carriers causing the Hanjin Shipping Co. to bankrupt at 
end of 2016 and leaving 2.9% of the market share to com-
petitors. Moreover, Drewry believes that, in 2017, the car-
riers’ financial results and profitability will continue to 
fall, thus forcing financially weak carriers to address their 
cost structures. At the same time, the operational stress 
experienced at the challenging market conditions, inflat-
ing debts and negative cash flows for an extended period 
of time will exert serious tensions on the carriers’ busi-
ness capabilities, causing further industry consolidation 
[25].
Figure 3 shows the shipping industry average Altman 
z- score from 2010 to 2016. Altman Z-score is the credit-
strength test that gauges likelihood of bankruptcy, based 
on a number of metrics from a company’s public state-
ments. The safe score is above 3 while score below 1.8 
means the company is probably heading for bankruptcy. 
It is clear that the industry score since 2011 is showing a 
high tendency for companies’ bankruptcy, which reached 
0.9 in 2016 (before Hanjin figures were excluded), and the 
score increased only to 1 after Hanjin was eliminated. This 
means that the industry could lose more companies if its 
financial situation is not improved. Shipping lines are al-
ways seeking a way to slim down operating costs and capi-
tal expansion as, between 2011 and 2016, the industry 
reduced its capital expansion (CAPEX) by half; from 25.2 
billion to only 12.4 billion [2]. Finally, in 2017, the only 
way for the industry to survive is to shelter among each 
other by mergers and acquisitions, as it could be the only 
“lifeboat” for many of them, as well as to be involved in al-
liances to optimize their economy of scale.
3.2 Shipping Lines Alliances and Market Concentration
The horizontal integration policy of the shipping liner 
companies, and backing up themselves through alliances, 
is not a new act. However, the recent pace of consolida-
tion could be driven not only to overcome their financial 
deficiencies but for geopolitical reasons as well. Figure 4 
shows the consolidation and partnerships that took place 
since the late 90s up to now. During that period, many 
companies disappeared, being swallowed up or merged 
with other companies. Up to the year 2001, the top 30 con-
tainer liner companies in addition to the alliances covered 
less than 50% of the market share, by 2011 this percent-
age increased to 70%. In 2014, the market share of the 
alliances only reached 50 % [27]. In the same context, in 
2017, only 3 alliances controlled nearly three quarters of 
the whole market. The significance of the resent alliances 
is the change of the market leaders’ policies, like those of 
Maersk and MSC, from operating solely to the engagement 
into alliance and forming the 2M alliance that controls 
Figure 3 Shipping Industry Average Altman Z- Score from 2010 to 2016
Source: Author, adopted from [2] 
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Figure 4 Evolution of Shipping Line Alliances 
Source: Author, data from [9]
Figure 5 Alliances Carrying Capacities and Market Share in 2017
Source: Author, data taken from [14]
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nearly one third of the market share. This act alone signifi-
cantly increases the market concentration and strength-
ens the shipping lines bargaining power toward ports.
Geopolitical reasons are also strongly present in this 
wave of alliances as economic super powers usually need 
and want to secure their supply chains. The new shipping 
alliances are showing a geopolitical flavour as each alli-
ance is dominated by a flag of country or continent in the 
sense that the 2M is European and the Ocean alliance is 
mainly Chinese, in spite of the presence of the French CMA 
CGM as a leading share in the Ocean alliance with its11.6% 
market share. China is in control of about 16.6% of the 
market share either directly through its own state compa-
ny “COSCO Shipping Line” or indirectly through the pres-
ence of the Hong Kong’s Company (OOCL) and Taiwanese 
company (Evergreen). Moreover, the COSCO already pro-
posed $6.3 billion to buy OOCL by which it will be the 
third largest carrier (Buxbaum P., 2017). In the same con-
text, the Chinese state-owned company “China Merchants 
Holding” owns 49% of the terminal operating company 
“Terminal Link” and the remaining 51% is owned by CMA 
CGM [16]. This means that in case of any future acquisi-
tion made by another Chinese state-owned company, the 
distribution of power within the alliances and even in the 
whole industry will be changed. This raises the question of 
how concentration in the shipping industry will affect the 
port operation business and competition.
Figure 5 shows the carrying capacities of the main 
three alliances member and their market share. It is clear 
that the all carriers are operating 2,499 vessels (over a ca-
pacity of 1000 TEUs) representing 60% of the world fleet 
of fully container vessels and controlling around 77% of 
the container business. Moreover, 2M alliance and Ocean 
Alliance are controlling nearly 1/3 of the market share 
each, while the Alliance is operating the largest vessels 
with an average of 6,346 TEUs/ ship, and controlling 17% 
of the world market share. 
3.3 Strength of shipping alliances in port operations
Since the 90s, shipping lines have been involved in con-
tainer terminal operations for the sack of controlling their 
business and squeezing cost, but, with the previously stat-
ed carrier’s market concentration, port competition will 
strongly be affected. Table 1 shows the alliances members’ 
involvement in port operation business in which nearly all 
carriers own and operate container terminals or berths, 
except Hapag-LIoyd and UASC. Moreover, Drewry predicts 
Table 1 Alliances shipping companies activities in terminal operation business in 2017
Alliance Carrier Terminal operation business
2M
Maersk Line Owns ”APM Terminals” which operates 76 port and terminal facilities in 95 countries
MSC Owns “Terminal investment limited” which is operates 35 terminals in 22 countries
Ocean Alliance
CMA-CGM Owns “CMA Terminals” which operates 13 terminals worldwide
COSCO Operates 158 container berths in 30 ports worldwide
OOCL  Operates 6 berths in USA and one in Taiwan
Evergreen Operates 2 terminals in Taiwan and one in Panama
The Alliance
MOL Operates 10 container terminals in 5 countries
K-Line Owns “Nitto Total Logistics” which operates 7 berths worldwide
NYK-Line Operates Container Terminals in 23 ports





Table 2 Ranking of Terminal Operators from 2010 to 2020 (Forecast) 
Terminal operator
Capacity Rank
2020 (forecast) 2016 2010
COSCO China shipping 1 4 & 8* 6
APM Terminal 2 2 4
PSA International 3 3 1
Hutchison 4 1 2
DP World 5 5 3
Terminal Investment Ltd 6 6 7
CMA - CGM 7 9 > 10
Source: Author, data taken from [7] 
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that, by 2020, port operations will be leaded and domi-
nated by carrier’s companies. In the same concept, Table 2 
presents the development of terminal operators ranking in 
which it is clear that COSCO will lead the industry by 2020, 
followed by APM Terminals. In addition, the industry will 
witness 2 more shipping lines sister companies on top of 
seven operators. In addition, carriers are also involved in 
joint projects and own shares in some terminals managed 
by “terminal-only” operators [7].
4 Impact of shipping dynamics on port 
competition
These changes, taking place in the shipping industry, 
could strongly affect port competition as ports are a cru-
cial part of this game. The carriers’ policy to survive by 
cooling down the competition among them will exert pres-
sure on many ports struggling to achieve their throughput 
targets. For example, the Malaysian Port Klang is expected 
to lose 10% of its annual throughput due to the new alli-
ance formation (CMA-CGM and PSA International) as CMA 
CGM will shift destinations to Singapore [19], [1]. On the 
other hand, cooperation between container terminals and 
shipping alliances could increase the efficiency of termi-
nal operations. Experts say “there is a need for more op-
erational collaboration between terminals and shipping 
lines to help deal with issues such as peaking and produc-
tivity” [6]. Moreover, some ports worldwide have started 
some sort of cooperation to face these market conditions, 
by combining certain resources and utilize them jointly in 
an effort to maintain a competitive edge. This was firstly 
applied in 2001 between ports of Copenhagen and Malmo 
and was the first of a kind to have a cross-border alliance 
between ports. In 2015, another example of a similar co-
operation took place between ports of Seattle and Tacoma 
in USA, with the focus on upgrading its terminal facilities 
and rail connections to further promote its competitive 
position [18].
5 Conclusion
Carriers competition in the last decade brought out the 
surplus in market carrying capacities with gigantic new 
vessels, coupled with weak market condition and poor re-
covering signs. This increases the desire for mergers and 
acquisitions, and further promotes formation of alliances 
to cool down the competition and to back up each other. 
This change in market dynamics increases the market con-
centration and the shipping lines bargaining power, and 
will defiantly affect competition among ports. Accordingly, 
one must ask for how long terminal operators, who are 
not a part of or operated by shipping liners, will survive 
with positive balance sheet, as the impact of shipping con-
centration will affect them sooner or later? 
Consequently, ports should take a proactive standpoint 
and consider forming port alliances or clusters that would 
be the way to survive and increase their bargaining power 
in this dynamic market. In other words, it is justified to re-
consider the co-petition concept or “cooperative competi-
tion” and imitate the carriers’ policies, in particular because 
ports are not flexible and mobile as shipping lines are. 
Ports are very essential for the supply chain of each 
country. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect from policy 
makers and governments to go hand in hand with ports 
to overcome the domination of shipping lines. In addition, 
taking into account geopolitics objectives too, regional 
agreements may also help and facilitate ports alliances, 
not only to support ports’ survivability but also to secure 
the national objectives. The co-petition concept must be 
reasonable and have a footprint on the ground as an easy 
and effective solution that will warrant a win-win situ-
ation among all parties. Finally, further researches and 
studying could be addressed to evaluate the methodology 
of co-petition between ports as well as to establish how 
this concept will affect ports efficiency. 
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